


SECURITY  
AND JUSTICE

## SECURITY AND JUSTICE

More than \$17 billion of U.S. reconstruction funds have been appropriated to train, equip, supply, and provide for the infrastructure support of the ISF. The FY 2007 Supplemental provided 60.6% of Iraq reconstruction-related funds to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF).

The plan to provide for ISF readiness involved four phases of development:

- partnership between MNF-I and ISF
- Iraqi army-led operations and clearing of areas of insurgency
- Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC): Iraqi authorities assume control and responsibility for their respective provinces
- security self-reliance: the GOI operates and sustains security forces through the organs of the state<sup>46</sup>

Escalating levels of violence and early ISF “lead” failures challenged the execution of this strategy. Increasing the end-strength of Iraqi army and police forces is essential to counter the insurgent and criminal activities. But threats to the integrity of the ISF force structure—including combat attrition, liberal leave arrangements, and sectarian and militia infiltration—have placed significant strain on the capacity of ISF to meet expanding end-state force requirements.


In July 2007, the President’s *Initial Benchmark Assessment* stated that the GOI “has made satisfactory progress toward establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan,”<sup>47</sup> by establishing the Executive Steering Committee and related subcommittees. The Report further noted that the Administration will “continue to monitor and engage with the committees to produce a satisfactory effect over the next 60 days.”<sup>48</sup>

### Transition to Iraqi Control

Progress in the Coalition’s efforts to transition responsibility to the GOI has been slower than anticipated. This quarter, Missan became the fourth province to transfer to provincial Iraqi control.<sup>49</sup>

Two other provinces that DoD had anticipated would have attained PIC status “by the spring of 2007”<sup>50</sup>—Qadissiya and Ninewa—have not met the conditions required for transfer. On May 30, 2007, Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah were transitioned to “Regional Iraqi Control,” under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).<sup>51</sup>

In its most recent report on Iraq’s stability and security, DoD revised its forecast for transferring security control. DoD now expects



**TRANSFER RATE OF FORWARD OPERATING BASES**

9010 RPT	TOTAL FOBS	FOBS TRANSFERRED	PERCENT FOBS TRANSFERRED
May 2006	NA	34	—
Aug 2006	110	48	43.6%
Nov 2006	110	52	47.3%
Mar 2007	NA	NA	—
Jun 2007	122	61	50.0%

TABLE 2.4

transition of all Iraqi provinces to PIC status “no later than March 2008.”<sup>52</sup>

The process of transferring Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to Iraqi control also has been affected by ongoing security operations. DoD reports that MNF-I turned over some FOBs to the Iraqis this quarter. But MNF-I also has established some new FOBs during 2007 to support the Baghdad Security Plan and “other elements in Iraq, including Coalition partners, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Transition Teams, other supporting entities, and the Department of State.”<sup>53</sup> As shown in Table 2.4, between November 2006 and June 2007, the number of FOBs in Iraq increased by 10.9%, from 110 to 122.<sup>54</sup>

## U.S. Support

The security and justice sector has received the largest portions of the \$44 billion in U.S. funds for Iraq’s relief and reconstruction—more than \$17 billion. For the allocations of funding to security and justice by source, see Figure 2.17.

To date, \$10.82 billion of the ISFF has been allocated to help meet the training and equip-

ment requirements of the ISF, of which, 61% has already been expended. The security and justice sector was allocated 34% of the \$18.44 billion in IRRF 2, and more than 93% of these IRRF funds have been expended. Of the total CERP funding for Iraq reconstruction, 7% was allocated to security and justice, and approximately 42% of these funds had been expended by the end of this quarter. For the status of the four funding streams, see Figure 2.18.

The ISFF funds part of the training, equipping, and fielding of the ISF. IRRF funding focused on large construction projects, but it has also provided funding for non-construction activities, such as arming the New Iraqi Army, training Iraqi police, assisting war victims, and supporting witness-protection programs. ESF has mainly funded infrastructure security efforts, and CERP has focused on condolence payments.


## RULE-OF-LAW INITIATIVES

Several initiatives are in progress to support the rule of law in Iraq and to strengthen the legal code, police force, judicial system, and correctional system. MNF-I, with support



Figure 2.17


**ALLOCATIONS TO SECURITY AND JUSTICE**  
\$ Billions, % of \$17.51 Billion  
Sources: DoD, Secretary of the Army Update (7/8/2007); DoS, *Iraq Weekly Status* (6/27/2007); MNC-I, Response to SIGIR (7/7/2007); ITAO,<sup>a</sup> *Weekly Status Report* (6/26/2007); IRMS, *ESF Cost to Complete* (7/5/2007); USAID, *Activities Report* (7/12/2007)



Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.  
a. By Executive Order, on May 8, 2007, the President created ITAO as the successor organization to the IRMO.  
b. Appropriation detail at the sector and subsector level for CERP is currently unavailable; therefore, the percentages for CERP are calculated using FY 2006 and FY 2007 dollars obligated.  
c. FY 2006 Supplemental Funds (P.L. 109-234).  
d. FY 2005, FY 2006, and FY 2007.

Figure 2.18

**OBLIGATIONS FOR SECURITY AND JUSTICE**  
\$ Billions, \$15.31 Billion Total  
Sources: DoD, Secretary of the Army Update (7/8/2007); DoS, *Iraq Weekly Status* (6/27/2007); MNC-I, Response to SIGIR (7/7/2007); IRMS, *ESF Cost to Complete* (7/5/2007)



Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.  
a. FY 2005, FY 2006 and FY 2007.  
b. FY 2005 and FY 2006.  
c. FY 2006 Supplemental Funds (P.L. 109-234).

from DoJ and DoS, has established the Law and Order Task Force to increase, among other things, the capacity of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).<sup>55</sup>

Security problems continue to hinder progress of the rule-of-law effort. For example, attacks and death threats have made some Iraqi judges reluctant to try cases related to terrorism or the insurgency. MNF-I thus established a Rule of Law Complex (ROLC) in Baghdad to “provide a secure location combining police, courts, forensic labs and corrections functions, and judicial housing and detention facilities.”<sup>56</sup>

This quarter, DoD reported that the first judicial proceeding at the ROLC was conducted before an Iraqi investigative judge on April 2, 2007. Nine Iraqi judges and 15 support personnel have been appointed to staff the new court since then.<sup>57</sup> In addition, DoD assigned 67 judge advocates, paralegals, investigators, and intelligence officers to the Law and Order Task Force, scheduled to begin arrival on May 15, 2007.

### ISFF

Of the 478 security projects funded by ISFF in FY 2005, FY 2006, and FY 2007, 51% are completed, and 9% have not started. For the status of ISFF projects, see Figure 2.19.





Figure 2.19

## STATUS OF ISFF FY 2005, FY 2006, AND FY 2007 PROJECTS - SECURITY AND JUSTICE

TOTAL NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 478

Source: IRMS, ITAO\* Rollup (6/29/2007)



Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.

\* By Executive Order, on May 8, 2007, the President created ITAO as the successor organization to the IRMO.

Project Type	Not Started	Ongoing	Completed	Total
Infrastructure	33	127	122	282
Training and Operations	9	39	107	155
Sustainment		26	10	36
Equipment and Transportation		2	3	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>478</b>

## Training, Equipping, and Fielding ISF

Although the Coalition has trained and equipped significant numbers of Iraqis, their capacity to conduct widespread counterinsurgency operations remains in question. As shown in Figure 2.20, the goals for required ISF end-state force levels have increased almost 225% above the initial estimates of the CPA's training programs. By the end of 2006, the number of trained forces met estimated end-state goals, and support efforts shifted to replacing force depletion and developing logistical capacities.<sup>58</sup> But in early 2007, overall force requirements were again increased to a goal of 385,000 trained ISF personnel.

This quarter, the number of trained and equipped ISF personnel increased by 22,100 to 353,100:


- 158,900 Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel<sup>59</sup>
- 194,200 police, highway patrol, and other Ministry of Interior officers<sup>60</sup>


Figure 2.20

## TRAINED AND EQUIPPED ISF PERSONNEL

Thousands

Sources: Statement of Work for Contract DABK01-03-R-0012, New Iraqi Army Training, June 9, 2003, p.4; CPA Update Briefing, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, September 2, 2003; DoD, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," October 25, 2005; Former Commanding General of MNSTC-I, Statement for the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on ISF, June 12, 2007.





Notwithstanding this extensive training, the *Initial Benchmark Assessment* questioned the capability of ISF units to operate independently, rating the GOI's progress as "unsatisfactory." The assessment stated that "the presence of Coalition partners and support remains necessary for ISF operations."<sup>61</sup>

#### **Fielding and Equipping Trained Troops**

As of May 14, 2007, 101 Iraqi Army (IA) combat battalions have become operational and are conducting operations at various levels of capability; 38 additional battalions are in the process.<sup>62</sup> However, the actual present-for-duty number of Iraqi Army personnel continues to be lower than reported. DoD states that only 65% of authorized personnel are active on duty in fielded units at any given time.<sup>63</sup>

To improve present-for-duty strength, MNSTC-I has funded training for 12,000 additional soldiers to bring combat unit levels to 110% of authorization. Initial training has already been completed for 10,300 of these new soldiers. In addition, MNSTC-I has funded the equipping of 18,000 new soldiers, who will serve as replacements for personnel losses.

Ministry of Defense forces are increasingly taking the lead in operations.<sup>64</sup> As of May 14, 2007, 9 Division Headquarters and 31 Brigade Headquarters had been assessed as capable of leading counter-insurgency operations, and 95 Iraqi Army battalions are now in the lead—up from 93 battalions in February. Although DoD reported last quarter that the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) was expected to gain control of all ten Army divisions by June

2007,<sup>65</sup> MNC-I still has operational control over the fifth and seventh divisions as of May 14, 2007, and a complete transition is now expected by November 2007.<sup>66</sup>

The logistics capability of the Ministry of Defense remains a key hindrance to the Iraqis' ability to assume the mission from the Coalition.<sup>67</sup> SIGIR has identified as "at risk" the MNF-I goal of a sustainable and manageable logistics operation at the Ministry of Defense by January 2008;<sup>68</sup> the projected transition dates of some of the activities lapsed this quarter.

A joint Iraqi and Coalition forces board is evaluating progress to determine when the Ministry of Defense will assume maintenance tasks. The ministry has "agreed, in principle to fund the National Maintenance Contract through May 2008 using a [foreign military sales (FMS)] case."<sup>69</sup> Contractors continue to be used to sustain 2 support battalions and 80 Garrison Support Units that provide logistics and support for divisions.

Other U.S.-funded initiatives include training and equipping the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs)<sup>70</sup> and partnering Coalition forces with Iraq's various energy infrastructure protection forces.<sup>71</sup> The Ministry of Defense has established 17 SIBs, which go through a two-phased re-training and equipping process to transform into regular Iraqi Army battalions.<sup>72</sup> This quarter, DoD reported that 13 SIBs are assessed to be capable of conducting operations side by side with Coalition forces.<sup>73</sup>



### Training Iraqi Police

Iraqi police level forces trained include:

- Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
- National Police (NP)
- Facilities Protection Service (FPS)
- Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and Directorate of Ports of Entry (POE)

IPS comprises the majority of the Ministry of Interior Personnel, reaching its manning target of 135,000 last quarter. Approximately 89% of authorized critical equipment has been distributed to IPS, and the rest will be delivered by the end of 2007. A significant portion of the equipment may no longer be serviceable because of combat loss and attrition.<sup>74</sup> Accountability for equipment transferred to IPS may also affect its availability for security uses.<sup>75</sup>

In early 2004, the Coalition Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) was created to recruit, train, equip, and sustain IPS. However, because there was little distinction between Iraqi military forces and civilian rule-of-law police service, police were often trained by soldiers instead of police experts. As a result, some issues received less emphasis, including rule of law, human rights and treatment of suspects and prisoners, and policing in a democracy.<sup>76</sup>

Currently, 222 Police Transition Teams (PTTs) are operating throughout Iraq to assist the development of IPS. Each team has 12 to 15 members. Most of these members are military personnel, and two to four team members


are civilian International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO), who provide civilian law enforcement expertise in technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management.

In its March report to the Congress, DoD noted that, “costs and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs to cover all of Iraq’s police stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs to conduct the full range of activities ...[coaching, joint patrolling, evaluating performance].”<sup>77</sup> Since March, the Ministry of Interior conducted an initiative to assess performance and effectiveness of Iraqi police stations, inspecting 44 of Baghdad’s 47 stations.<sup>78</sup>

Managing the National Police has been a problem for the Ministry of Interior. Thus, in October 2006, MNSTC-I implemented a four-phased National Police Transformation Program to redirect the program toward police functions. Phase 2 includes emphases on human rights, rule of law, and police ethics.<sup>79</sup> As of June 27, 2007, approximately 26,300 members of the NP have completed retraining.<sup>80</sup>

The integrity of the NP, however, remains questionable. There have been numerous accusations that the NP are functioning as death squads, committing murder, torture, and kidnapping.<sup>81</sup> In the past seven months, 7 of the 9 National Police Brigade Commanders and 16 battalion commanders have been replaced because of concerns about sectarian activities.<sup>82</sup>

Similar to the PTTs, 39 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) now support the



development of National Police units by mentoring, training, and facilitating communication with Coalition forces, and they assess the operational readiness of the National Police.<sup>83</sup>

The FPS protects infrastructure and facilities controlled by their respective 27 ministries. The FPS has also been a problem, with allegations of involvement in violent crimes and other illegal activity. Reform and centralization of FPS operations have been a stated objective since mid-2006.<sup>84</sup> But the Ministry of Finance has not yet centralized funding with the Ministry of Interior, and thus, the status of FPS personnel and equipment apparently remains aligned with their respective ministries.<sup>85</sup> Once consolidated, FPS personnel will total 98,000, down from 145,000 reported in 2006.<sup>86</sup>

## IRRF PROJECTS

By the end of June 2007, approximately 89% of IRRF-funded projects had been completed in the security and justice sector. For a list of IRRF projects and status, see Figure 2.21.

IRRF has funded the construction and rehabilitation of border forts, fire stations, police stations, public-safety training academies, prisons and corrections facilities, courthouses, and witness-protection facilities.<sup>87</sup> Past SIGIR inspections have reviewed border forts, police stations, courthouses, and prisons, with mixed results. For example, SIGIR's inspection of the border forts at Sulaymaniyah found design flaws that the contractors subsequently corrected.

Construction at the **Khan Bani Saad Correctional Facility** was scheduled for completion in late November 2007; however,

construction work at this project site was terminated on June 30, 2007 due to "impact of severe security issues and slow rate of progress by the contractor."<sup>88</sup> The new construction of the **Zarka Rehabilitation Center** in Dahuk was completed on June 20, 2007.<sup>89</sup>

The 800-bed **Nassriya Correctional Facility** is estimated to be completed by November 2007, a month behind what was reported last quarter.<sup>90</sup> In mid-2006, a SIGIR inspection of the facility found the quality of work and sustainability elements to be at acceptable levels, although project slippage and cost overruns resulted in the scope of work being reduced from a 4,400-inmate facility.<sup>91</sup> Currently, the project is 62% complete.<sup>92</sup>

In addition to IRRF, the FY 2006 supplemental appropriated \$91.4 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL) funding, of which \$82 million was for prison construction.<sup>93</sup> According to GRD, which is responsible for overseeing construction of the prison projects, most projects are in the pre-award stage under this program.<sup>94</sup> The last IRRF-funded security and justice construction project, the **Al Hillah Courthouse**, is scheduled to be completed in late August 2008.<sup>95</sup>


This quarter, SIGIR project assessments found that the **Al Rasheed Brigade Base** and the **Iraqi Ministry of Defense Building** met design standards and are both fully operational. Construction at the **Iraqi C-130 Base** also met contract requirements, but generator sustainability was a problem. For additional information on these assessments, see Section 3 of this Report.



Figure 2.21

**STATUS OF IRRF 2 PROJECTS - SECURITY AND JUSTICE**  
**TOTAL NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 3,169**


Sources: IRMS, ITAO\* Rollup (6/29/2007); USAID, Activities Report (7/12/2007)



Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.  
\* By Executive Order, on May 8, 2007, the President created ITAO as the successor organization to the IRMO.

Project Type	Not Started	Ongoing	Completed	Total
Marla Ruzicka Iraq War Victims Fund		169	1,104	1,273
Commanders Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction		1	602	603
Facilities Repair		9	426	435
Border Enforcement	2	1	270	273
Focused Stabilization		123	115	238
Establish New Iraqi Army	2	9	76	87
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps	4	7	72	83
Police Training and Assistance	9	5	60	74
Judicial Security and Facilities		6	31	37
Investigations of Crimes Against Humanity		1	34	35
Miscellaneous		2	7	9
Reconstruction of Detention Facilities		3	2	5
Witness Protection Program		4	1	5
National Security Communications Network			3	3
Penal Facilities		1	2	3
Public Safety Training and Facilities		1	2	3
Facilities Protection Services			2	2
Security and Law Enforcement			1	1
Total	17	342	2,810	3,169





## ESF PROJECTS

Approximately 21% of the ESF FY 2006 Supplemental was appropriated to the security sector. USACE entered into an interagency agreement that fully committed the \$277 million programmed to Infrastructure Security Protection (ISP), which represents approximately 88% of ESF funds in this sector. Of the programmed amount for ISP, GRD has obligated approximately \$34.42 million and expended \$2.09 million.<sup>96</sup> SIGIR has requested review of the problem presented by infrastructure security, and this ESF funding has helped address that problem.

Examples of ISP projects include:

- **Exclusion Zones:** protected areas to provide security to linear infrastructure, typically comprising fencing, setbacks, towers, berms, and ditches
- **Intrusion Detection Systems:** electronic sensors to detect perimeter breaches
- **Identity:** biometric vetting and creation of the Iraq National ID Card program, which provides a basic foundation to identify and vet Iraqi citizens and foreign nationals
- **Infrastructure Hardening:** such as chain-link fence, razor wire, guard towers, and barriers to better protect critical infrastructure against interdiction attempts and security breaches<sup>97</sup>

The ISP projects are typically designed for facilities hardening, improved lighting, communications, and improvements to forward-operating bases used by the Iraqi Army to

protect critical infrastructure.<sup>98</sup> Most of these projects are for oil pipeline exclusion zones and electrical transmission towers and will be solicited, awarded, and administered by GRD.<sup>99</sup> Figure 2.22 shows the status of ESF projects in the security and justice sector.

## CERP


CERP FY 2006 and FY 2007 funds represent less than 1% of the total U.S. funds for security projects in Iraq and 7% of the total CERP FY 2006 and FY 2007 funds for reconstruction in Iraq.

As of early July, 1,019 of the 1,400 planned projects have been completed, and 381 are ongoing. CERP security projects include repairs of civic and cultural facilities, restoration of damage resulting from military opera-

Figure 2.22

### STATUS OF ESF\* PROJECTS - SECURITY AND JUSTICE TOTAL NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 72

Sources: IRMS, *ESF Cost to Complete* (7/5/2007);  
IRMS, *ESF Project Tracker* (6/29/2007)



\* Funded by the ESF FY 2006 Supplemental.

## SECURITY AND JUSTICE




Figure 2.23

### STATUS OF CERP FY 2006 AND FY 2007 PROJECTS - SECURITY AND JUSTICE

TOTAL NUMBER OF PROJECTS: 1,400

Source: MNC-I, Response to SIGIR (7/7/2007)



Project Type	Ongoing	Completed	Total
Condolence Payments	202	586	788
Rule of Law and Governance	68	237	305
Repair of Civic or Cultural Facilities	71	105	176
Repair of Damage from Military Operations	40	91	131
<b>Total</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>1,019</b>	<b>1,400</b>

tions, rule-of-law and governance projects, and condolence payments. Infrastructure-hardening projects were also completed last year using CERP funds.<sup>100</sup> See Figure 2.23 on CERP-funded project status.


Since 2004, CERP security projects have averaged approximately \$40,000 per project.

From 2004 to 2006, the Baghdad province experienced an increase in the average value per security project from approximately \$18,000 in 2004 to approximately \$68,000 in 2006. Figure 2.24 shows the change in the average value per project for years 2004, 2005, and 2006.

Figure 2.24

### AVERAGE VALUE PER CERP SECURITY PROJECT BY GOVERNORATE

Source: IRMS, CERP Excel Workbook (6/29/2007)



Note:

Data is compiled using FY 2004, FY 2005, and FY 2006 CERP funds. The years indicated correspond to the actual start dates of the projects.